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A commentary on
Action scaling of distance perception is
task specific and does not predict “the
embodiment of culture”: a comment on
Soliman, Gibson and Glenberg (2013)
by Wilson, A. D. (2014). Front. Psychol.
5:302. doi: 10.3389/fpsyg.2014.00302
Soliman et al. (2013) set out to
demonstrate how the bodily level of anal-
ysis can unify explanations in psychology.
Our argument was that common sensori-
motor mechanisms underlie many of the
behavioral phenomena that are currently
segregated as cognitive, social, or cultural.
Toward that end, we re-characterized a
cultural construct—self-construal along
the dimension of independence and
interdependence (Markus and Kitayama,
1991)—as reflecting degree of interaction
with ethnically diverse others.
According to our cultural motor-effort
hypothesis, the interdependence-
independence continuum is in part deter-
mined by tuning sensorimotor behavior
through interactions. Interdependents
tune vocal, gestural, expressive facial pat-
terns, as well as interactions in greeting,
eating, walking, dancing, praying (and so
on) with members of their in-groups. In
contrast, independents tune their inter-
actions with a more ethnically-diverse set
of people. Consequently, interdependents,
more so than independents, would antici-
pate greater motor effort when interacting
with out-groups (vs. in-groups) because
of poor tuning. Furthermore, reasoning
from Proffitt and Linkenauger (2013) as
well as Schnall et al. (2008), anticipated
motor effort should lead to increased dis-
tance judgments. Thus we predicted, and
found, that interdependents judge distance
to in-group members as shorter than do
independents.
Wilson (2014) questioned our appli-
cation of Proffitt and Linkenauger and
Schnall et al. As he notes, Proffitt’s data
(although not data from Schnall et al.) sug-
gest that effects of anticipated motor effort
are restricted to particular motor systems.
Hence, Wilson reasoned, the anticipated
effort in interacting should not affect scal-
ing of distance when planning to walk.
Here we address Wilson’s reasoning by
(a) pointing to several research projects
that suggest leakage across motor systems
rather than modularity, and (b) suggest-
ing why previous data, importantly, Witt
et al. (2004, 2010) did not observe this
leakage.
As one example of leakage, consider
data reported by Gentilucci et al. (2001).
When reaching for a block, the larger the
block, the wider people unintentionally
open their mouths. In addition, the larger
the block, the louder they pronounce syl-
lables printed on the block.
Now consider in more detail retroac-
tive motor contagion (RMC): the ubiqui-
tous finding that if two action patterns are
conjoined, planning of the second action
influences planning of the first action.
Demonstrations of RMC can be found in
Adam et al. (2000), Khan et al. (2007,
2010), and Lajoie and Franks (1997).
The “end-comfort effect” can also be
seen as a type of RMC. For example,
the kinematics of the transport-to-grasp
movement toward a bottle systematically
vary depending on whether the bottle is
later to be displaced to a different spot,
is used to pour water into a glass, or is
to be thrown away (Ansuini et al., 2008).
Importantly, RMC can cross anatomi-
cal and neuro-representational boundaries
within the motor system and shows coor-
dination across different effectors. van der
Wel and Rosenbaum (2007), for exam-
ple, asked participants to locomote to a
table, grasp a bottle, and then move it
to another spot that was either close to
or far from its initial location. The ini-
tial motor pattern (i.e., locomotion) was
found to be influenced by the distal motor
pattern (i.e., object transport). Namely, a
participant’s final step was on the side
opposite to the direction of the forthcom-
ing transport movement when that trans-
port required one more step after grasping
(see also Cockell et al., 1995 and Studenka
et al., 2012).
Thus, modularity of the motor
system at the anatomical and brain-
representational level does not always
hold at the functional level. Instead,
conjoining two action patterns induces
an informational flow across effectors
and planned goals. Importantly, this
influence holds whether one or differ-
ent motor systems are involved in the
sequence, and whether the goals planned
are homologous (e.g., tapping followed
by tapping) or different (i.e., locomoting
then grasping). In short, these findings
support our assumption that anticipated
effort of interaction can affect anticipated
effort to walk, and thereby affect distance
judgments.
With the above as a backdrop, why then
do Proffitt’s data (e.g., Witt et al., 2004,
2010) seem to suggest modularity? One
possibility is based on a subtle difference
between the design of our experiments
and the Witt et al. experiments. In Witt’s
experiments, the manipulation phase tar-
gets one motor system and then tests the
effect of the manipulation on perceived
distance as the participant intends to
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perform another task. For example, adapt-
ing Proffitt and Linkenauger’s (2013) ter-
minology, participants are adapted while
temporarily turned into throwing pheno-
types, and then tested while in the walking
phenotype. Typically, it was found that the
visio-motor scale developed while in one
phenotype did not transfer to the other:
the thrower-turned-walker participants do
not show effects of the earlier throwing
manipulation on their distance judgments
while walkers (Witt et al., 2004), and vice
versa (Witt et al., 2010).
In our experiments, however, no
behavioral phenotype was turned on,
manipulated, switched off, replaced by
another, and then examined. Instead, our
participants were walker-then-interactor
phenotypes throughout. That is, the phe-
notype we manipulated (the interactor
phenotype) was (a) always turned on and
(b) always conjoined with the walker
phenotype. Thus, by virtue of being
conjoined with the interaction system dur-
ing simulation, the locomotion system was
“contaminated” by the constantly-running
interaction system. This conjoining led to
the effort parameter values instantiated
in the interaction system to diffuse into
the parameters in the locomotion system.
We captured the state of the latter param-
eters through visual-distance estimates,
and we hypothesized that they function,
by proxy, as indicators of the amount
of effort experienced by the interaction
system.
We believe that these subtle design
differences render our original results
and theoretical arguments immune to
Wilson’s critiques. Perceived motor effort
to interact with in-groups and out-
groups can still be a conceptually valid
re-characterizations of the cultural con-
struct of interdependence-independence.
And, importantly, when viewed in light
of the RMC effects, our results can be
categorized as belonging to the same
class of phenomena explained by Proffitt’s
theoretical framework. We thank Wilson
for providing the opportunity for us to
develop this account in greater detail, and
we look forward to tests of the proposal.
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